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Abstract. In this paper, we study dependence of the success rate of adversarial 
attacks to the Deep Neural Networks on the biomedical image type, control pa-
rameters, and image dataset size. With this work we are going to contribute to-
wards accumulation of experimental results on adversarial attacks for the com-
munity dealing with biomedical images. The white-box Projected Gradient De-
scent attacks were examined based on 8 classification tasks and 13 image datasets 
containing a total of 605,080 chest X-ray and 317,000 histology images of ma-
lignant tumors. We concluded that: (1) An increase of the amplitude of perturba-
tion in generating malicious adversarial images leads to a growth of the fraction 
of successful attacks for the majority of image types examined in this study. (2) 
Histology images tend to be less sensitive to the growth of amplitude of adver-
sarial perturbations. (3) Percentage of successful attacks is growing with an in-
crease of the number of iterations of the algorithm of generating adversarial per-
turbations with an asymptotic stabilization. (4) It was found that the success of 
attacks dropping dramatically when the original confidence of predicting image 
class exceeds 0.95. (5) The expected dependence of percentage of successful at-
tacks on the size of image training set was not confirmed. 
Keywords: Adversarial Attacks, X-ray Images, Histology Images. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Problem of Security of Computerized Diagnosis 
It is well recognized that the security issues of computerized disease diagnosis are of 
paramount importance. Recently, the Deep Learning technologies gave the community 
well-grounded promises to become an effective tool in biomedical image analysis and 
computerized diagnosis [1, 2]. Currently, a large fraction of studies focused on the de-
velopment of increasingly more accurate models while less attention has been given to 
the security and robustness of these models. Unfortunately, it was found that along with 
the high success, the Deep Learning brought some new security problems. This time 
the security worries arose from the vulnerability of methods capitalizing on Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNN) to so-called adversarial attacks. The vulnerability to adversarial 
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image examples was first noticed in [3] and more systematically discussed by research-
ers from Google in [4]. A bit later, in 2015-2016 a group of researchers has provided 
several examples of the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial attacks [5]. It was exper-
imentally proven that adversarial attacks may lead to failures in making correct classi-
fication decision. In the context of Computer Assisted Diagnosis (CAD) systems this 
corresponds to possible failures in correct disease diagnosis. Contrary to the “tradi-
tional” computer viruses, these attacks are performed with the help of so-called adver-
sarial images which are nothing but specially crafted images that push DNNs to wrong 
classification decisions. More recently, there have been several works published on the 
problem of adversarial attacks, their types, and possible ways of defense (see, for ex-
ample, surveys [6, 7] and paper 8).  
1.2 Basic Properties of Adversarial Attacks and the Purpose of This Study 
In general, the problem of adversarial attack is not studied well as yet. Moreover, sev-
eral key points that have been discovered recently are counter-intuitive. The basic prop-
erties of adversarial attacks were intensively studied in [3, 4, 8] and illustrated on large 
image datasets coming from computer vision applications. In our view, the most inter-
esting facts and statements from papers [3, 4, 8] which are relevant to the present study 
are as follows: 
 The state-of-the-art DNNs demonstrate good generalization performance on differ-
ent image classification tasks with high variability of image objects and back-
grounds. Thus, we can expect such networks should be robust to small perturbations 
of input images. However, it is shown that very tiny and even imperceptible non-
random (i.e., intentional, malicious, adversarial) image modifications could totally 
change the network’s prediction result. 
 The adversarial images which were specially crafted to attack one specific DNN are 
statistically hard to correctly classify for other DNNs too. This holds true even under 
condition the other DNNs are of different architecture, trained with different param-
eters and even on different image subsets. 
 A popular approach in computer vision is to use convolutional network features as 
space where Euclidean distance approximates perceptual distance. However, this re-
semblance is clearly flawed if images that have an immeasurably small perceptual 
distance correspond to completely different classes in the network’s representation. 
It should be noted, though, that the majority of activities on studying adversarial attacks 
and possible methods of defense are carried out in the field of computer vision but not 
in the biomedical imaging domain. 
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to study dependence of the success rate of adver-
sarial attacks on the image type, image dataset size, and control parameters. In a more 
general context, with this work we are going to contribute towards accumulation of 
experimental materials on adversarial attacks for the biomedical imaging community.  
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2 Original Image Data 
For studying adversarial attacks, we have selected two different kinds of biomedical 
images. The first image type is represented by chest X-ray images which often used in 
a screening for detecting lung diseases, diseases of cardiovascular system, and skeletal 
abnormalities as well as for monitoring various treatment processes. The second image 
type was represented by color histological images which are continuously playing the 
role of a gold standard in cancer diagnosis. These two opposite image types were cho-
sen for experimentation because chest X-rays holding certain anatomical shape with 
the relatively high role of spatial, “geometrical” structure whereas the histological im-
ages can be viewed as a “shape-free” color texture.  
2.1 Chest X-ray Images 
Norm of Chest X-Ray (X-Norm-All). All X-ray image data used with this study were 
the natively-digital X-ray scans which were extracted from a PACS system. The PACS 
records contain information on the results of a periodic chest screening of the popula-
tion of a two-million city conducted during the years 2001–2014. Thus, the reduced 
version of the database we used here contains a total of 1,908,926 records. Each record 
corresponds to a single digital chest X-ray image. All the records also included data on 
patients’ age, gender, and textual radiological reports. The reports are written in a free-
form native, non-English language. Each report was made by an experienced radiolo-
gist. In complicated cases these reports were resulted from a joint image reading by a 
small board of radiologists. All the radiologists were employed in the framework of a 
large-scale telemedicine screening system on a permanent basis.  
The radiological reports present information on possible lung diseases, diseases of 
cardiovascular system (heart and blood vessels), and information on possible skeletal 
abnormalities such as scoliosis, deformation of ribs, etc. The list of lung abnormalities 
included pneumosclerosis, emphysema, fibrosis, pneumonia, focal shadows, bronchi-
tis, and lung tuberculosis. Technically, all the X-ray scans were represented by 1-chan-
nel 16-bit non-compressed images which were originally stored in DICOM format. The 
image resolution varied from rarely occurred small size of 520×576 pixels to relatively 
large fraction which was sized to 2800×2531 pixels. Since all the images were natively 
digital, there were no film scanning artifacts presented in the image data. 
An image was categorized into the class of Norm if there were no visible signs of 
any type of abnormalities in mediastinum, skeleton and the lungs themselves. Normal 
cases were selected from the database by way of parsing of radiological reports with 
the help of a small set of a limited number of key phrases the radiologists typically use 
to label images with the absence of any visible abnormalities. Because the well suffi-
cient amount of images of the Norm was available, the only strict matches of the report 
texts with one of the key phrases have been considered. A small fraction of technically 
unusable images was discarded by the same reason. Following this procedure, a total 
of 1,215,648 cases were stored to the basic image dataset referred to as X-Norm-All 
which was used as a repository of the chest X-Ray of Norm in this study. 
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Pathology of Chest X-Ray (X-Path-All). Similar to the Norm, labeling of abnormal 
lung cases was done using a keyword match in the textual descriptions. As a result, 
22,355 cases were labeled as belonging to the class of pneumosclerosis, 9,285 items 
were recognized as emphysema, 19,844 images were categorized to the fibrosis, 5,718 
images got labels of “pneumonia”, 2,897 lungs were recognized as the ones with focal 
shadows, 821 subjects were classified to the class of having bronchitis, and 793 cases 
have received the label of “tuberculosis”. It should be appropriately stressed that one 
single case may have several labels of abnormality simultaneously. Also, it should be 
remembered that here we are dealing with the screening data. This particularly means 
that the above lung disease labels are preliminary and are not confirmed clinically. In 
other words, we should admit the presence of certain bias which is caused by over-
estimation of the probability of presence of pathological changes what is natural for the 
screening stage. Finally, as a result of the above selection procedure, we end up with a 
total of 46,882 X-ray scans presenting various lung abnormalities.  
2.2 Histology Images 
Ovary and Thyroid Cancer (H-OV-TH). The test histology image dataset was ac-
quired from 46 patients with confirmed diagnosis of Ovary cancer (23 patients) and 
Thyroid cancer (23 other patients). All the data were sub-sampled from a private data-
base resulted from previous project on studying angiogenesis of malignant tumors. Tis-
sue probes represented tumor regions and surrounding non-tumor tissue which is con-
ditionally termed here as Norm. After biopsy the issue samples were immunohisto-
chemically processed using D2–40 mesothelial marker for highlighting tumor angio-
genesis. An intermediate image dataset consisting of 4000 images and representing 4 
classes including Ovary Tumor (H-OV-T, 1000 images), Ovary Norm (H-OV-N, 1000 
images), Thyroid Tumor (H-TH-T, 1000 images), and Thyroid Norm (H-TH-N) was 
acquired with the help of fully-digital Leica DMD108 optical microscope. Finally, to 
be used for benchmarking the adversarial attacks, the intermediate color images of 
2048×1536 pixels in size were partitioned into 256×256 sections without overlap. This 
procedure resulted in the histology image dataset H-OV-TH consisting of a total of 
192,000 images, 48,000 images in each of four of above abbreviated classes. 
Breast Cancer (H-BR). Brest cancer histology images employed with this study 
were sampled from a dataset of 500 whole slide Hematoxylin-Eosin stained images 
used for benchmarking of methods of prediction of breast cancer proliferation score 
[9]. A total of 125,000 color images of 256×256 pixels in size representing malignant 
tumors (H-BR-N, 62,500 images) and areas not affected by tumors (H-BR-N, 62,500 
images, conditionally referred here to as Norm) were arbitrary sampled from 500 whole 
slide images on the highest resolution level. 
2.3 Study Groups 
Adversarial attacks were examined with the help of dedicated study groups presented 
in Table 1 together with their key characteristics.  
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Table 1. Study groups and their characteristics 
Image 
type 
Acro-
nym 
Classification 
task 
N img 
total 
N img 
by classes 
CLS 
score 
X-ray, 
Norm 
X-NR2 2 age groups: 
G1: 20-35 years 
G2 50-70 years 
200,000 G1: 100,000 
G2: 100,000 
0.98 
X-ray,  
Norm 
X-NR3 2 age groups: 
G1: 17-24 years 
G2: 25-41 years 
G3: 42-80 years 
550,080 G1: 183,360 
G2: 183,360 
G3: 183,360 
 
0.83 
X-ray, 
region of Aorta 
X-AO 2 classes: 
C1: Aorta with an-
terior rotation 
C2: Norm 
27,000 C1: 10,980 
C2: 16,020 
0.78 
X-ray, 
Tuberculosis 
X-TB 2 classes: 
C1: Tuberculosis 
C2: Norm 
28,000 C1: 14,000 
       (1,369) 
C2: 14,000 
0.82 
Histology, 
Ovary cancer 
H-OV 2 classes: 
C1: Tumor 
C2: Norm 
96,000 C1: 48,000 
C2: 48,000 
0.92 
Histology, 
cancer of Thy-
roid Gland  
H-TH 2 classes: 
C1: Tumor 
C2: Norm 
96,000 C1: 48,000 
C2: 48,000 
0.94 
Histology, 
Ovary cancer 
and cancer of 
Thyroid Gland  
H-OV-
TH 
4 classes: 
C1: Ovary Tumor 
C2: Ovary Norm 
C3: Thyroid Tumor 
C2: Thyroid Norm 
192,000 C1: 48,000 
C2: 48,000 
C3: 48,000 
C4: 48,000 
0.91 
Histology, 
Breast cancer 
H-BR 2 classes: 
C1: Tumor 
C2: Norm 
125,000 C1: 62,500 
C2: 62,500 
0.97 
For brevity purposes the necessary explanations on creation of study groups provided 
below in an itemized style. 
1. Groups X-NR2 and X-NR3 of chest images of Norm of subjects of different ages 
constitute good test bed for classification tasks due to known age-related changes. 
In both cases the main principles for selecting images from original dataset X-Norm-
All containing 1,215,648 items was to preserve gender balance as well as equivalent 
population of classification sub-groups. 
2. In the aorta classification tasks X-AO the areas containing anterior regions of aorta 
were extracted automatically from original X-ray images and final results were ex-
amined visually. Since original images were of different size, these regions re-scaled 
to 256×256 based on individual resolution. 
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3. Due to the lack of lung tuberculosis images, the available dataset of 1,369 images 
was inputted to a dedicated augmentation procedure to finally get 14,000 items. Note 
that this is only the case in this study where the augmentation procedure was used. 
4. The last column of Table 1 presents the original classification accuracy.  
In all the occasions except for classification tasks X-NR3 the images used for experi-
mentation on adversarial attacks were 256×256 pixels in size. Examples of input images 
used in adversarial experiments are presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 1. Examples of original images and their adversarial versions with different amplitude ε. 
3 Experimental Setup  
The image data of each study group presented in Table 1 were split into the training 
and validation datasets in the proportion of 80/20 keeping same balance of class repre-
sentatives. After that we trained several neural networks, one for each study group. The 
achieved classification scores are listed in last column of the Table 1. In order to reduce 
the variability of essential parameters, we used well known InceptionV3 architecture 
as a single model and AdamOptimizer training optimizer. 
As soon as the training was completed, we started to examine adversarial attacks. 
Usually generation of adversarial images is performed by applying specific intensity 
modifications to original images for producing their adversarial versions. Depending 
on what information are needed to generate adversarial examples the algorithms are 
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categorized into the white-box and black-box attacks. For white-box methods architec-
ture of network and trained weights should be available. Furthermore, in some cases 
loss function and training optimizer are also required. For black-box attacks the neces-
sary information include the type of images that classified by DNN. In this paper we 
study the white-box Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attacks algorithm. This algo-
rithm is of gradient-based type. That means that the source of perturbations is a gradient 
of some function taken from DNN that can be calculated rapidly with the help of back-
propagation technique. The formula of PGD attack is given by: 
 𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘 − 𝑙𝑟 ∗ Clipx,ε (∇𝑥 (𝑦𝑝(𝑥𝑘))) , 𝑘 ∈ [0, 𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 − 1]  (1) 
In this equation the following three parameters are introduced: maximal amplitude 
of perturbation ε, number of executed iterations max_iter and the learning rate coeffi-
cient lr. In this work, we are focusing on examining the influence of ε and max_itert. 
The learning rate was not changed during the experiments and the same value of it was 
used for all classification tasks. Finally, we carry out the experiments in the following 
way: 
(1) Define the set of values of ε which is going to be examined. 
(2) For every value of ε and every image x in validation set of a classification task 
generate adversarial image xk by formula (1), where k iterates from 1 to max_iter. 
(3) Save probabilities that were predicted by DNN for adversarial images. We 
don’t need to store the images themselves because saving logits is enough to perform 
further analysis. 
4 Results 
The experimentation pipeline described above was executed for all image datasets 
listed in Table 1. Values of the amplitude of perturbation ε were sampled evenly from 
the interval ranged from 0.02 to 0.20 with a step of 0.02 what is resulted in 10 repeti-
tions of computational experiments. Examples of original images and their adversarial 
versions with different amplitude ε are given in Fig. 1. Eight illustrative examples of 
successful attacks are shown in Fig. 2. In all these attacks the adversarial image exam-
ples were created using amplitude ε=0.02 and the number of iterations NI = 20. 
In order to assess the results of the attacks, we calculated the fraction of the images 
that have been misclassified. The “native” misclassifications made by DNN which are 
not related to attacks are not counted. We referred to this measure of success as the 
Attack success rate. At the first step we studied the dependency of the attack success 
rate on the perturbation amplitude ε. Motivation for looking onto this relation steams 
from the idea that permission to generate more perturbations with larger magnitude 
should lead to a higher attack rate. This is expected due to the nature of adversarial 
examples which is explained in [5]. Indeed, allowing the algorithm to search examples 
in a wider neighborhood gives it a greater chance to detect proper perturbations. The 
results summarized in form of corresponding plots of Fig. 3a suggest that the proposed 
idea is almost right: for 7 out of 8 datasets the expectation was confirmed. 
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Fig. 2. Examples of successful attacks. Each image pair shows original image (left) and its ad-
versarial version (on the right): (a) Aged person from the group 50-70 recognized as young one 
from the 20-35 group. (b) Young male subject from the group G1 aged 17-24 of classification 
task X-NR3 categorized to 42-80 group G3. (c) Tuberculosis patient misclassified to Norm. (d) 
Normal aorta misclassified as Pathology. (e) Normal Ovary tissue diagnosed as Cancerous. (f) 
Tissue of Thyroid Gland recognized as Ovary. (g) Breast cancer misclassified as Norm. (h) 
Fragment of image with normal tissue of breast was wrongly identified as being malignant. 
It should be noted that the nature of adversarial examples does not prove the state-
ment in a formal way. As our algorithm moves in direction of gradient with fixed lr 
there is no warranty that heavier perturbations would not “overstep” the desired class. 
This could be the reason that the plot corresponding to the X-AO dataset demonstrates 
sort of descending behavior.  
For better understanding of significance of the number of iterations, we have con-
sidered dependency of attack success rate on it. In general, the step-by-step modifica-
tion of input images should gradually increase the rate and asymptotically become a 
constant when the amount of perturbation is high enough and almost every pixel lies 
on defined boundary. In this study such an assumption was confirmed what is evident 
from Fig. 3b. 
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Fig. 3. Dependence of attack success rate on the amplitude of perturbations (a), the number of 
iterations (b), image classification confidence (c), and the size of image training set. 
As it can be seen from the figure, in 6 out of 8 datasets the limit seems to be reached 
while for 2 remaining the slope of plots appears to be sufficiently high. 
During the experimentation it has been noticed that there is certain relation between 
the probability, i.e., confidence of categorization of the original, unperturbed image to 
a specific class and the result obtained on the subsequent step of its attack. In order to 
discover whether this phenomenon is regular, we have performed additional experiment 
which consists of the following steps:  
(1) Bining the probability range of [0.5, 1.0] into 10 equal intervals (bins). 
(2) Categorization of each image into one of 10 bins using its maximal probability 
produced by neural network. For instance, in case the output probabilities of two-class 
classification task predicted as [0.81, 0.19] it should be categorized into bin [0.80, 0.85]. 
(3) Calculate attack success rate separately for each histogram bin. 
Fig. 3c shows that the images failed to the bins which correspond to the highest 
probabilities are misclassified less often than the others. Furthermore, for image da-
tasets H-OV and H-OV-TH this pattern is very prominent. Such a behavior could be 
caused by correlation between the image’s probability and the size of class subspace. 
Namely, in case of high probability the classes’ own neighborhoods should be larger. 
Finally, we examined the links between the size of training image dataset and the 
attack success rate. To this end, we gradually increase the dataset size by way of sam-
pling more and more images from H-BR, re-training the DNN, and attacking it again. 
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However, results shown in Fig. 3d gives us no reason to support such a conclusion on 
our image datasets and conditions of experimentation.  
5 Conclusions 
Results reported with this study allow drawing the following conclusions. 
(1) An increase of the amplitude of perturbation in generating malicious adversarial 
images leads to a growth of the fraction of successful attacks for the majority of image 
types examined in this study. The only exception was demonstrated by X-ray images 
of the aorta with anterior rotation which represent sort of “geometrical” kind of patho-
logical changes. 
(2) Histology images tend to be less sensitive to the growth of amplitude of adver-
sarial perturbations. 
(3) Percentage of successful attacks is growing with an increase of the number of 
iterations of the algorithm of generating adversarial perturbations with an asymptotic 
stabilization.  
(4) It was found that the success of adversarial attacks dropping dramatically when 
the original confidence of predicting image class exceeds 0.95. 
(5) Dependence of percentage of successful attacks on the size of image training set 
was not confirmed. 
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